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A￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. The literature on time-inconsistent preferences introduced naive, partially
naive and sophisticated as types of agents that represent diﬀerent levels of unawareness of
agents’ self-control problems. This paper incorporates time-inconsistent players in a sequential
bargaining model. We ﬁrst consider "naive" agents who never learn about their types and show
that bargaining between such a player and a standard exponential agent ends in immediate
agreement. The more naive a player, the higher his share. If naive agents can learn their type
over time, we show that there is a critical date such that there is no agreement before that
date. Hence, existence of time-inconsistent players who can learn as they play the game can be
another explanation for delays in bargaining.
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1. I￿￿￿￿"#￿￿￿￿￿
In our daily lives, we always face decisions to make and alternative actions to choose over time.
Traditional economic analysis expects people to behave rationally (take actions maximizing their
∗Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University, 608 Kern Graduate Building, University Park,
PA, 16802. E-mail: zafer@psu.edu
†I am grateful to my advisor Prof. Kalyan Chatterjee for his guidance and advice throughout this project.
I also thank participants of Wednesday meetings at Penn State. All remaining errors are mine.
1TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 2
payoﬀ or utility) and thus behave consistently (following the original contingent plan or strategy)
when they make these decisions. In other words, a rational agent’s goals (and strategies to achieve
them) at diﬀerent dates cannot be in conﬂict and he always agrees with his future selves. This
means he will not have a following sort of conversation with himself: "Ok, I had decided to do this
before; but now, let me do something else" (e.g., "We had agreed with my coauthors that I was
going to write only the introduction of our grant proposal as of tomorrow, but let me write both
introduction and the literature review in one week" or "I had decided to renew my computer at
least 6 months from now, but let me buy this new wide screen laptop now").
The above argument, however, misses the fact that in real life, individuals always suﬀer from
these kinds of conﬂicts. This is due to the vulnerability of them to self-deception, over-optimism,
over-conﬁdence, self-control and many other characteristics mentioned in the psychology literature.
One way of incorporating some of these characteristics into the decision making analysis is to
introduce time-inconsistent preferences. Hyperbolic discounting is often used in the economics
literature to model time-inconsistency (see, Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001;
Phelps and Pollak, 1968).
The literature on time-inconsistency (interchangeably, preference reversals or self-control prob-
lems) introduced naive, partially naive and sophisticated as types of agents that represent diﬀerent
levels of unawareness of agents’ self-control problems. Naive agents are not aware of their future
preference reversals at all. Sophisticated agents are fully aware of their self-control problems. Par-
tially naive agents introduced by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) perceive their self-control problems
to some extent.
A naive time-inconsistent agent procrastinates. However, deadlines and potentially learning pre-
vents her from procrastinating costly tasks forever. One might argue that evolutionary "learning"TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 3
would cause time-inconsistent preferences to disappear from the population. However, evolution
acts over a long time horizon. Here we focus on individuals becoming less naive about their self-
control problems during the course of a bargaining game.
In my earlier paper (Akin, 2004), I consider an alternating-oﬀers bargaining game where there
are time-inconsistent players who cannot learn and show an immediate agreement result by using a
modiﬁed Nash equilibrium solution concept. In that paper, bargaining is the second stage of a two
stage principal-agent game whose ﬁrst stage is self-investment of the agent. On the other hand, in
this paper, I introduce learning in a sequential bargaining context.
In the model we consider, diﬀerent types of agents are engaged in an inﬁnite horizon alternating-
oﬀers bargaining game. When we consider the interplays among diﬀerent types of agents, the games
involving partially naive agents are the most interesting ones. During the game, partially naive
agents, by observing possible rejections, might gradually become more aware of their naivete. We
model this in a similar way to Yildiz (2004), though Yildiz examines optimism about recognition
process rather than self-control.
Learning works as follows: partially naive agent has an initial belief about her future self-
control problems. When she observes a rejection during the course of the game, she interprets
these rejections in a way that her actual self-control problems might actually be more severe than
she perceives and she updates her belief accordingly. On the other side, the opponent has a trade-
oﬀ between delaying the game and extracting more rent from the partially naive agent and cost of
delaying (discounting). When the cost of delaying outweighs the beneﬁt, the game ends (probably
with some delay).
With time-inconsistent players, the solution concept used could be problematic. We consider two
solution concepts, "naive backward induction" and "equilibrium", developed by Saraﬁdis (2004).TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 4
In the naive backward induction (NBI), the naive player plays a best response to what she thinks
the opponent will play. However, since she has wrong beliefs about herself and about what the
opponent thinks about herself, she may be surprised by how players (including herself) play during
the course of the game. Thus, due to this wrong belief formation, naive agent is not able to
anticipate the opponent’s action correctly. In the equilibrium, players are endowed with some
beliefs about how others will play the game. Each player takes these beliefs -which turn out to be
correct in equilibrium as opposed to NBI- as given and plays a best response.
We ﬁrst consider naive agents who never learn about their types and we, by using "equilibrium"
as the solution concept, show that bargaining between such a player and a standard exponential
agent ends in immediate agreement. When we use NBI as the solution concept, there is immediate
agreement when exponential agent oﬀers ﬁrst. When naive agent oﬀers, there is one period delay.
Moreover, the more naive a player, the higher his share. With NBI, we obtain perpetual disagree-
ment between two naive agents. If naive agents can learn their type over time, we show that there
is a critical date such that there is no agreement before that date. At each case where diﬀerent
types of agents are engaged in a sequential bargaining game, we examine whether there is delay
and what the equilibrium shares are. There are two main arguments. First one is that existence
of time-inconsistent agents who may learn to be more consistent over time may explain bargaining
delays to some extent and second one is that being naive makes you better oﬀ except the opponent
is also naive.
There is a growing literature about time-inconsistency. First, Strotz (1956) proposed that
individuals may not have stationary preferences over time. They might value close satisfaction more
than distant ones. Phelps and Pollak (1968) formalized this kind of behavior in a mathematically
more convenient way, called β − δ approach. Afterwards, Laibson (1997) used this formalizationTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 5
to explain individuals’ observed saving behavior. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b, 2001)
examined time-inconsistent individuals’ decision making in diﬀerent economic environments such
as when to complete a task, agent-principal problems, which option to choose from a menu of
options and when. What we add is to carry this formalization to the context of a non-cooperative
game.
Although some of the literature just brieﬂy talk about potential learning considerations as
extensions to the existing models (see, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001; Saraﬁdis, 2004), there is
no distinct work, as far as we know, focusing on this important aspect of time inconsistency.
Dellavigna and Malmendier (2003) examines self-control in the market and shows that some of the
observed behavior of consumers (for example in the health clubs) can be explained by the time
inconsistency of the agents. They also mention the eﬀect of learning of these agents to explain
some empirical results. They say: "Consumers choosing monthly or annual contracts (out of
three diﬀerent contracts: pay per visit, monthly and annual) in the health clubs would on average
have saved money paying per visit...In four-ﬁfth of the cases, these contracts are terminated and
learning has a large eﬀect in this observation...It is hard to believe that individuals remain naive
about their own preferences and ability after a lifetime of experience". We, in this paper, not only
carry time-inconsistency to the context of non-cooperative games but we also address learning of
time-inconsistent agents to be more dynamically consistent over time in this context for the ﬁrst
time.
We use the alternating-oﬀers bargaining framework proposed ﬁrst by Rubinstein (1982). Ru-
binstein assumes stationarity of preferences over time. On the other hand, Coles and Muthoo
(2003) examined bargaining situations in a non-stationary environment. In their paper, they study
Rubinstein’s bargaining game in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves through time inTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 6
a non-stationary but smooth manner. In our model, we have a non-stationary environment too.
However, non-stationarity comes directly from the preferences of the players.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the solution concepts. Section 3
introduces the formal model. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium of the game without learning.
Section 5 incorporates learning considerations into the model. Section 6 concludes the paper with
a brief discussion of the results.
2. S￿*#￿￿￿￿ C￿￿￿￿+￿￿
The solution concepts used here depend crucially on the beliefs agents that have about oﬀers and
about their future selves. We, therefore, discuss these beliefs ﬁrst. A time-inconsistent agent may
be one of three types: naive, sophisticated or partially naive. The naive hyperbolic agent (NHA) is
naive about her time inconsistency, which means she thinks that she will be patient but in reality she
will be impatient in future periods. The sophisticated hyperbolic agent (SHA) is fully aware of her
time inconsistency and behaves accordingly. Partially naive agent is aware of his future self-control
problems only to some extent1. Time-consistent agent is fully rational and knows opponent’s type.
The naive hyperbolic agent has wrong beliefs about herself and also believes that the rational agent
thinks about her what she thinks about herself.
For the games including only time consistent players, we have Subgame Perfect Nash Equilib-
rium (SPNE) as the solution concept. For the games including only time consistent and sophis-
ticated hyperbolic players (SHA): since SHA is fully aware of his preference reversals, he may be
treated as a time consistent player with standard impatience βδ. This implies that we have sta-
tionarity of preferences and mutually consistent beliefs. Thus, we can again apply SPNE. On the
1Types will be deﬁned and explained formally in the next section.TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 7
other hand, If at least one of the players is NHA, then we have to deﬁne and use slightly diﬀerent
solution concepts. There are two diﬀerent solution concepts proposed by Saraﬁdis (2004), "Naive
Backward Induction" (NBI) and "Equilibrium" in games with time-inconsistent players (hyperbolic
discounters).
In a NBI, the player (she) who has self-control problem plays a best response to what she thinks
the rational opponent will play. In other words, players can rationalize what they will play during
the course of the game (that is, NBI solution is rationalizable). One caveat of this concept is
that since a time-inconsistent player may not implement what she has planned for the future and
she has wrong beliefs about both herself and the rational opponent, she may be surprised by how
players (including herself) play when the game proceeds. She also believes that the rational agent
thinks about her what she thinks about herself. That is, she is also naive about beliefs of the
rational agent about her. In NBI, players form beliefs about how other players will play the game
by introspection and putting themselves in the shoes of the other players. However, this belief
formation process leads the NHA to anticipate opponent’s actions incorrectly.
In an "Equilibrium", players are endowed with some beliefs about how others will play the
game. Each player takes these beliefs as given and plays a best response, without questioning
how and why other players have chosen to play this way (e.g., each announces their strategies in
advance). In addition, since each player plays the game as others expect them to play, the original
beliefs are conﬁrmed in equilibrium. An unfavorable aspect of "equilibrium" is that the naive time-
inconsistent player may not understand why her opponent plays the way he does, though she has
correct beliefs about him. The following analogy can be made to understand "equilibrium" better:
Agents announce their strategies in advance and each player plays a best response according to
these announcements. When we talk about announcements, incredible threats arise as an issue. ToTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 8
prevent incredible threats, we impose subgame perfection. Since for a naive agent, what she plans
to do in the future may diﬀer from the actual actions in the future, the "equilibrium" requires both
the planned and the actual strategies of the naive agent to be best responses to the strategies of
the opponent’s strategies.
We now construct necessary notation for formal deﬁnitions. We will consider a two player
alternating-oﬀers bargaining game. One player is time consistent (EA) and the other is a time-
inconsistent naive agent (NHA) 2. We will create an inﬁnite sequence of ﬁctitious players from the
NHA. Let NHAt represent the t − period self of the NHA. NHAt has available actions that the
NHA has from period t onwards.





Deﬁne strategy sNHA as the sequence of moves, each of which is the move of NHAt at time t (ﬁrst




The above arguments motivate the following formal deﬁnition of the solution concepts.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy proﬁle s = (sEA,sNHA0,sNHA1,sNHA2,...) is an "equilibrium" if:
1. Strategy sEA is a best response to sNHA for the EA,
2. Strategy sNHAt is a best response to sEA for each NHAt,
3. In all subgames, s induces an equilibrium (satisﬁes condition 1 and 2).
2As mentioned, these solution concepts are mainly for games including at least one naive hyperbolic agent. Games
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Deﬁnition 2. A strategy proﬁle s = (sEA,sNHA0,sNHA1,sNHA2,...) constitutes "Naive Back-
wards induction" (NBI) solution if:
1. Strategy sEA is a best response to sNHA for the EA,
2. Each strategy sNHAt survives backwards induction in the game between the EA and the
NHAt.
In order to make the two solution concepts and understand the diﬀerence between them, we
will give an example (see the game-tree). Let a NHA (she) and an EA (he) play a ﬁnite sequential
bargaining game to share a size 1 pie. The EA will oﬀer at t = 0 and the game ends at t = 3.
The pie will vanish at the end of the third period if they cannot reach an agreement. As shown in
the ﬁgure, the EA oﬀers (x0,1 − x0), where x0 is his share, and the NHA accepts of rejects. If she
accepts, the pie is allocated according to the oﬀer (x0,1 − x0). If she rejects, she makes a counter
oﬀer (y1,1 − y1) at t = 1, where y1 is the share of the EA. If the game proceeds to second period,
the EA oﬀers (x2,1−x2). If the game proceeds to t = 3, the NHA oﬀers (y3,1−y3) and if the EA
accepts, the pie is allocated, if he does not, they both get zero.
The tables show the "equilibrium" and "Naive Backward Induction" solution strategies of each
player. We now will argue that these strategies actually constitute "equilibrium" and "Naive
Backward Induction" solutions, respectively.
In order for a strategy proﬁle to constitute an "equilibrium", there are three conditions (see
deﬁnition 1). The equilibrium strategies below constitute an equilibrium since they satisfy those
conditions. For the ﬁrst condition, sEA has to be a best response to sNHA for the EA. We can
see this easily because each action in sEA in diﬀerent periods is a best response to each action in


























Game-tree for the example
Figure 1:
The Game ends with 
(xo, 1-xo), where 





t=1 Offers y1= δ(1-βδ)
t=2 Says yes if 1-x2=βδ
t=3 Offers y3=0 sNHA3
t=3 Offers y3=0
t=0 Says yes if 1-xo= βδ(1- δ(1- βδ)) sNHA
t=3 Offers y3=0
t=2 Says yes if 1-x2=βδ sNHA2
t=3 Offers y3=0
t=2 Says yes if 1-x2= δ
t=1 Offers y1= δ(1-βδ) sNHA1
t=3 Says yes always t=3 Offers y3=0
t=2 Offers 1-x2= βδ t=2 Says yes if 1-x2= δ
t=1 Says yes if y1= δ(1-βδ) t=1 Offers y1= δ(1-δ)
t=0 Offers 1-xo=βδ(1- δ(1- βδ)) t=0 Says yes if 1-xo= βδ(1- δ(1- βδ)) sNHA0
“Equilibrium” Strategies
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The Game ends with 
(xo, 1-xo), where 




t=1 Offers y1= δ(1-δ)
t=2 Says yes if 1-x2=δ
t=3 Offers y3=0 sNHA3
t=3 Offers y3=0
t=0 Says yes if 1-xo= βδ(1- δ(1- δ)) sNHA
t=3 Offers y3=0
t=2 Says yes if 1-x2=βδ sNHA2
t=3 Offers y3=0
t=2 Says yes if 1-x2= δ
t=1 Offers y1= δ(1-δ) sNHA1
t=3 Says yes always t=3 Offers y3=0
t=2 Offers 1-x2= βδ t=2 Says yes if 1-x2= δ
t=1 Says yes if y1= δ(1-βδ) t=1 Offers y1= δ(1-δ)
t=0 Offers 1-xo=βδ(1- δ(1- δ)) t=0 Says yes if 1-xo= βδ(1- δ(1- δ)) sNHA0
“Naive Backward Induction” Strategies
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for each NHAt. To see this, check sNHA0 ﬁrst. If the NHA0 rejects the oﬀer of EA at t = 0, then
she thinks she will oﬀer y1 = δ(1 − δ) at t = 1 and knows that EA will reject this. At t = 2, if
she accepts the EA’s oﬀer, she gets βδ (which has a discounted value of βδ2βδ at t = 0), if she
rejects, she will get 1 for sure (which has a discounted value of βδ3 at t = 0). She compares all
these possibilities from her perspective3. It turns out that accepting the EA’s oﬀer at t = 0 is the
optimal strategy for NHA0. For NHA1, it can easily be seen that sNHA1 is the optimal strategy
and so on. For the third condition, we can repeat this analysis for each subgame and see that the
ﬁrst two conditions are satisﬁed in all subgames.
In order for a strategy proﬁle to constitute a "NBI", there are two conditions (see deﬁnition
2). The NBI strategies above constitute a NBI solution since they satisfy those conditions. Again,
sEA has to be a best response to sNHA for the EA. We now check whether the EA can increase
his payoﬀ by oﬀering less to the NHA0. If he oﬀers less, he knows she will make an oﬀer that he
will certainly reject and he will get (1 − βδ) for sure at t = 2. However, the discounted value of
this payoﬀ is always smaller than what he can get from oﬀering according to his original strategy
[1−βδ(1−δ(1−δ)) > δ2(1−βδ)]. Thus, sEA is a best response to sNHA. The second condition is
also satisﬁed as follows: From the perspective of each NHA, her strategy has to survive backwards
induction between her and the EA. For 0th self of NHA, she thinks as follows: "I can get 1 at
t = 3 for sure. To convince me, the EA will oﬀer δ at t = 2. To convince him, I have to oﬀer at
least δ(1 − δ) at t = 1 and at t = 0, he will oﬀer me βδ(1 − δ(1 − δ)) that I will accept". Similar
arguments can be made for each self of NHA. Thus, each NHAt survives backwards induction.
On the other hand, if there are two naive agents are engaged in a game, then we have to revise
the above deﬁnitions as follows:
3speciﬁcally: βδ(1 − δ(1 − βδ)) > βδ
3 or 1−δ
1−β > δ
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NHA(i): ith Naive Hyperbolic Agent. EA: Exponential Agent (Rational). NHAt(i) = t −
period self of the NHA(i).
Players are represented by ”i”and”j” where i ￿= j ∈ {1,2}. Now s represents a strategy proﬁle

































Deﬁnition 3. A strategy proﬁle s constitutes an "equilibrium" in the existence of two naive agents
if
1. Each sNHAt(i) is a best response to sNHA(j) for every NHAt.
2. In all subgames, s induces an equilibrium (satisﬁes condition 1).
Informally, each self of the naive player plays a best response to what will actually be played
by the other naive player. We also impose subgame perfection.
The following ﬁgure shows a simple example where two naive agents are playing a game.
NHA(1) thinks at t=1 that she will choose "8 at t = 3" over "7 at t = 2" and "10 at t = 3"TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 14
over "9 at t = 2" . However, at t = 2, she prefers "7 at t = 2" to "8 at t = 3" and "9 at t = 2"
to "10 at t = 3" because of her tendency for immediate gratiﬁcation. Similarly, NHA(2) thinks at
t=1 that he will choose "6 at t = 3" over "5 at t = 2" and "4 at t = 3" over "3 at t = 2". However,
at t = 2, he prefers "5 at t = 2" to "6 at t = 3" and "3 at t = 2" to "4 at t = 3". In other words,
at t = 1, NHA(1) → 8t=3 ￿ 7t=2 and 10t=3 ￿ 9t=2
at t = 2, NHA(1) → 8t=3 ≺ 7t=2 and 10t=3 ≺ 9t=2
and
at t = 1, NHA(2) → 6t=3 ￿ 5t=2 and 4t=3 ￿ 3t=2
at t = 2, NHA(2) → 6t=3 ≺ 5t=2 and 4t=3 ≺ 3t=2
We can summarize beliefs of each agent as follows:
NHA(1) :
She believes that she will play "right" independent of which node she is at.
She believes that he will play "Right".
NHA(2) :
He believes that he will play "Left".
He believes that she will play "left" independent of which node she is at.
In the example, if x = 9, then ((out, r, r); Left) constitutes an equilibrium. If x = 7, then ((in,
r, r); Left) constitutes an equilibrium. We can see this as follows.
x = 9 :
NHA(1) thinks that NHA(2) will play "Right" if she plays "in" although he announces his
strategy as "Left". Then, she will play "right" and get 8 at t = 3. Since playing "out" gives 9, she






Left                         Right
NHA(1) NHA(1)
left               right          left               right
(9, 6*)                  (10*, 4*)       (7, 5)              (8*, 3)
t=1
t=2
Payoffs with stars (*) are earned at t = 3. Others are earned at t = 2.
Figure 4: Game-tree for the example. This is a slightly diﬀerent version of the example of Saraﬁdis (2004).TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 16
On the other hand, NHA(2) thinks that NHA(1) will play "left" regardless of where she is
although she announces his strategy as "right". Then, he will play "Left" and get 6 at t = 3 instead
of playing "Right" and getting 5 at t = 2.
So, NHA1 plays "out" and the game ends.
x = 7 :
NHA(1) thinks that NHA(2) will play "Right" if she plays "in" although he announces his
strategy as "Left". Then, she will play "right" and get 8 at t = 3. Since playing "out" gives 7, she
plays "in".
On the other hand, NHA(2) thinks that NHA(1) will play "left" regardless of at which node
she is although she announces his strategy as "right". Then, he will play "Left" and get 6 at t = 3
instead of playing "Right" and getting 5.
What actually happens at t = 2 is that they both change their minds and play the other
strategies that they have. Speciﬁcally, NHA1 plays "left" at both her information sets, which
conﬁrms the original belief of NHA2 about her and NHA2 plays "Right" conﬁrming the original
belief of the NHA1 about him.
So, NHA1 plays "in", NHA2 plays "Right" and NHA1 plays "left".
Thus, each of the naive agents plays a best response to what the other player will actually play
and beliefs of each agent about the other is conﬁrmed in equilibrium but not the beliefs about
themselves. Obviously, the announced strategies of each agent are vulnerable to changes because
of their self-control problems.
Now, we will introduce the model and examine what the equilibrium outcome will be in the
cases where ﬁrstly, we assume no updating of beliefs and secondly, we allow updating of beliefs.TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 17
3. M￿"￿*
Let T = {0,1,2,3,...} denote the inﬁnite set of possible agreement times. Let i ￿= j ∈ {1,2}




2 |u1 + u2 ≤ 1
￿
. At each time t, i oﬀers a utility pair u =
￿
u1,u2￿
∈ U. If j accepts
the oﬀer, the game ends and if there is rejection, then at time t + 1, j oﬀers a utility pair. If they
never agree, then each player gets 0.
Players can be one of four types: time-consistent exponential type (EA), Naive type (NHA),









and the Partially naive agent has the following sequence of discount factors:
￿
1,βδ,￿ βδ2, ￿ βδ3,...
￿
where δ is the standard time-consistent impatience with δ ∈ (0,1), β is time-
inconsistent preference for immediate gratiﬁcation or the self-control problem of the agent with
β ∈ (0,1). Let ￿ β be a person’s belief about her future self-control problems- her beliefs about what
her taste for immediate gratiﬁcation, β, will be in all future periods. The NHA believes she will not
have future self-control problems in the future, therefore has perceptions ￿ β = 1. The SHA knows
exactly what her future self-control problems will be in the future, therefore has perceptions ￿ β = β.
The partially naive person has perceptions ￿ β ∈ (β,1).
An evolutionary preference structure can be imposed on naive and partially naive agents’ beliefs
because they are not fully aware of their future preference reversals. We, therefore, can incorporate
learning into the environments where there are naive and partially naive players. Three diﬀerent
learning approaches can be pursued: 1. No learning at all, 2. Immediate learning and 3. Gradual
learning. Without learning, ￿ β ∈ (β,1] does not evolve over time, which means agents believe that
their self-control problem, β, will disappear (β will be ￿ β = 1) or diminish (β will be ￿ β) afterTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 18
tomorrow and they will not change this belief whatever happens in the future periods (at time
t > 1, she believes that she will discount t + 1 by ￿ βδ). In immediate learning case, we assume
players learn immediately whenever they observe a rejection (either rejection of their oﬀer or they
reject an oﬀer), that is, 1 ≥ ￿ β > β becomes ￿ β = β immediately after one rejection. Gradual
learning examines behavior of players who learn to be more sophisticated gradually in time, that
is, ￿ β may not equal 1 and may evolve over time and gets closer to β. They learn by introspection
about themselves during the evolution of the game. We will follow Yildiz’s (2004) framework to
model learning.
We now will examine these three approaches in order. First, we assume that there is no learning
at all. Then, we will examine the other two approaches allowing learning.
4. E-#￿*￿￿￿￿#￿ W￿￿￿￿#￿ L￿￿￿￿￿￿/
We will study "Equilibrium" as the ﬁrst solution concept. We will show that without learning,
players will immediately agree. Unique solution directy follows from Rubinstein. Afterwards, we
will examine NBI as the second solution concept.
We have two solution concepts and in diﬀerent economics environments one can be more plau-
sible to use. Especially, if there is no precedent or past experience between players, NBI is the
appropriate solution concept to use because the only possible way to form beliefs about the oppo-
nent is to put themselves in the shoes of other players. Since basic assumptions of NBI ﬁts better
to our framework, we will focus on it more.
Since it will be needed in the following results, it is useful to write down the equilibrium of the
Rubinstein bargaining game where players are exponential type and have diﬀerent discount factors
δ1 and δ2. We can write the result as either the limit case of the ﬁnite horizon game or the recursiveTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 19
way of solving it like in Shaked-Sutton, using stationarity of the game.
Remark 1. In the inﬁnite horizon alternating-oﬀers game with both players have exponential
discounting with discount factors δ1 and δ2, the equilibrium payoﬀs are:
(x∗,1 − x∗) where x∗ =
1 − δ2
1 − δ1δ2
and x∗ is the payoﬀ of the agent 1, making ﬁrst oﬀer.
Informally, a Nash equilibrium involves players playing best responses to their beliefs about
the other player and the beliefs are correct and mutually consistent. Not surprisingly, with time-
inconsistent players, the last requirement is diﬃcult to satisfy. Given this caveat, subgame perfect-
ness is deﬁned in the usual way as being Nash after every history.
4.1. "Equilibrium". We know from the general framework of the Rubinstein model that play-
ers will reach an agreement immediately in equilibrium since there is discounting. First player
oﬀers an x∗ such that second player accepts and realized payoﬀs would be (x∗,1 − x∗). A NHA
is relatively impatient for tomorrow and thinks that she will be more patient for periods onward.
If future periods are reached then she will reoptimise, thereby choosing actions that are diﬀerent
from the ones foreseen. In SHA case, the rational opponent (he) will anticipate that the SHA is
sophisticated and that if future periods are reached, her discount rate will be βδ and she is aware
of this. Thus, he makes oﬀers according to the conjecture that the SHA’s discounting rate is eﬀec-
tively βδ. Following claim shows that SHA will get the amount of payoﬀ where she has an eﬀective
discount rate ￿βδ￿ and EA has ￿δ￿.
Claim 1. In the inﬁnite horizon alternating-oﬀers game on a size 1 pie with only one player (so-
phisticated) has hyperbolic discounting, SHA, the equilibrium payoﬀs are the following:TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 20
if SHA makes the ﬁrst oﬀer, payoﬀs are (x∗,1−x∗) where x∗ is the share of SHA and equals to
1−δ
1−βδ2.




Proof. We can use the Shaked-Sutton approach (1984) to ﬁnd the equilibrium payoﬀs in this
problem. In order to use this approach, we need to have stationarity. Stationarity (in the sense of
Rubinstein, 1982) can be interpreted as, the preference of (x,t) over (y,t + 1) is independent of t.
This means that the preference over getting x at time t and getting y at time t +1 is independent
of time where x and y are the shares of a size 1 pie. In other words, the agents do not have any
preference reversals over time.
As it is explained above, the game, with an EA and a SHA, turns out to be the Rubinstein
alternating-oﬀers bargaining game with stationary preferences δ1 = βδ and δ2 = δ. Then, the
following would be true since we have stationarity:
1 − x∗ = δ(1 − y∗)
y∗ = βδx∗
which gives the following results:
y∗ = βδ(
1 − δ
1 − βδ2) and x∗ =
1 − δ
1 − βδ2
So, when SHA oﬀers ﬁrst then she (SHA) gets x∗ and when EA oﬀers ﬁrst, she (SHA) will get
1 − y∗.
As we can infer from the discussion in the solution concept section, in the concept of "equi-
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beliefs. Strategies that are best responses to these beliefs have to satisfy the three conditions in the
deﬁnition of the equilibrium. According to the deﬁnition and the example, we can conclude that
when a naive agent and a rational agent play an alternating-oﬀers bargaining game, the rational
agent plays as if he plays against a sophisticated hyperbolic agent or a rational agent who has βδ
discount factor. This is optimal strategy from the perspective of him because the naive agent takes
these beliefs as given and she plays a best response to these beliefs. She cannot understand why
he announces his strategies in this way but she plays a best response anyway. She does think that
these may be incredible threats but actually even if she thinks like that, the announced strategies
induce an equilibrium at each subgame because if the subgames are actually reached, she will again
be impatient and these beliefs will be conﬁrmed.
Claim 2. In the inﬁnite horizon alternating-oﬀers game with only one player (naive) has hyperbolic
discounting, NHA, the equilibrium payoﬀs are like the following:
1.If the EA makes the ﬁrst oﬀer, payoﬀs are:
(x∗,1 − x∗) where x∗is the share of the EA and equals to
1 − βδ
1 − βδ2.
2.If the NHA makes the ﬁrst oﬀer, payoﬀs are:
(x∗,1 − x∗) where x∗is the share of the NHA and equals to
1 − δ
1 − βδ2.
Proof. 1. The EA, by oﬀering x∗, he should make the NHA indiﬀerent between accepting
and rejecting. He knows that the NHA has discount factor βδ between t = 0 and t = 1, so he
should make an oﬀer x∗ satisfying
1 − x∗ = βδ(1 − y∗)
Since the EA knows that the NHA will discount any future period with βδ, he oﬀers as if he is
playing against a rational agent with discount factor βδ. As a best response, the NHA oﬀers y∗ toTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 22
the EA satisfying
y∗ = δx∗
we get the result in the claim. This result actually is the result where two rational agents are
playing the game and one of them has δ (oﬀering ﬁrst), the other has βδ discount factor.
2. This is very similar to the above case that only the order of oﬀers changes. The NHA, by
oﬀering x∗, she should make the EA indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting. So, she should
make an oﬀer x∗ satisfying
1 − x∗ = δ(1 − y∗)
Since the EA knows that the NHA will discount any future period with βδ, he oﬀers as if he is
playing against a rational agent with discount factor βδ. So, he oﬀers y∗ to the NHA satisfying
y∗ = βδx∗
we get the result in the claim.
It turns out that the EA oﬀers same shares to both the sophisticated agent and the naive agent.
The rationale behind the latter is the following: the EA plays a best response to what will actually
be played by the NHA. Although, the NHA is not aware that she may follow diﬀerent strategies in
the future and she does not agree with the EA, she plays a best response to what she is given (the
announced strategies of the EA). This leads to the above result even the future periods are not
reached and even the EA’s strategies seem as incredible threats. These strategies are actually the
subgame perfect strategies because if the future periods would have been reached, then the original
beliefs of each agent would be conﬁrmed.
We now check the payoﬀs of the agents when they have diﬀerent characteristics. We assume
complete information that means each player knows the other player’s characteristic, e.g., in aTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 23
NHA-NHA game, a naive player knows that the other player is naive but she does not know she,
herself, behaves naively.
In the table below, row player, player 1, makes the ﬁrst oﬀer to the column player, player 2,
in the alternating-oﬀers bargaining game. The payoﬀs in the table are such that ﬁrst entry is the
payoﬀ of the row player and second entry is the payoﬀ of the column player, e.g., P23 represents
the game where SHA makes the ﬁrst oﬀer to the NHA and gets the ﬁrst entry of the P23. P11 is the
case of the classical alternating-oﬀers bargaining game. P12 and P21 are the results of the claim
1. P13 and P31 are the results of the claim 2. P22 is the same case where two EA with eﬀective
discount factors ￿βδ￿. P23 is a similar case to the P13 with EA has an eﬀective discount factor ￿βδ￿.
P32 is a similar case to the P31 with EA has an eﬀective discount factor ￿βδ￿. P33 is a similar case
to the P22 becauseeach thinks that she will be patient after tomorrow and that the other is naive
but since they will take the other’s beliefs as given, it will give same result with P22.
We can compare the payoﬀs of each player by checking the equilibrium payoﬀ table. The table
implies the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Assume each agent has the same time-consistent impatience, δ. Further, assume that
the self-control problems of the agents, if any, are also same, β and δ > β. If we use "equilibrium"
as the solution concept, then regardless of whether a player oﬀers ﬁrst or second and regardless of
the opponent’s type (EA,NHA or SHA), his payoﬀ will be PEA > PNHA = PSHA according to
his type.
Proof. We can infer the result from the table below:TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 24

































1 − βδ2 >
1
1 + βδ
2. If a player makes the second oﬀer, then in terms of payoﬀs, if she is EA, then she does better





1 − βδ2 ;1−
1 − δ
1 − βδ2 >
βδ
1 + βδ
Brieﬂy, this theorem states that given the assumptions on preferences, regardless of your oppo-
nent’s type, you get a higher payoﬀ if you are an EA and less payoﬀ if you are a NHA or a SHA.
Thus, rational players always do better than hyperbolic agents.TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 25
4.2. Naive Backwards Induction (NBI). In this part, we will study bargaining games in-
cluding at least one naive agent by using the NBI as the solution concept. We will check each case
separately. The assumption is that NHA never updates her beliefs about herself and the opponent.
Proposition 1. If two naive agents are engaged in an alternating-oﬀers bargaining game, then
NBI gives "never agree" as the only solution.
Proof. The above result seems odd because "never agree" gives the worst payoﬀ to each of
the players so they must not follow this strategy. This arises because neither of the naive agents
is aware that the game will evolve like this (that they end up with zero payoﬀ). Moreover, since
there is no learning, they do not update their beliefs and change their strategies (they stay naive
however the game evolves).
Since the belief structure is crucial to understand the proof, we will mention it again. Naive
agent believes that she will be time-consistent from tomorrow on. She also believes that the
opponent thinks about her what she thinks about herself. In other words, she believes that the
opponent believes that she will be time-consistent from tomorrow on. That is, she is naive about
herself and also what the opponent thinks about herself, too.
Yildiz (2003) points out that if it is common knowledge that the players will remain suﬃciently
optimistic for a suﬃciently long future, then in equilibrium, they will agree immediately. That is,
excessive optimism alone cannot be a reason for a delay in agreement. In our case, players stay
optimistic about their own preferences forever, but we do not get an immediate aggreement, even
an agreement. Optimism in our context is the degree of naivete. Completely naive agent is the
most optimistic agent because she is so optimistic that she believes that she will be time-consistent
from tomorrow on for sure (optimism is connected to time-consistency because it is advantageousTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 26
in terms of payoﬀ and implies no self-control problem).
Since there is informational (and behavioral) deﬁciencies of agents about themselves, here, we
cannot talk about common knowledge of optimism or its persistency over time. This informational
structure makes the above result possible. Now, we examine what happens during the course of
the game.
Let i oﬀers (i,j) = (xt,1 − xt) at each even time period t (t = 0,2,4...) and j oﬀers (i,j) =
(yt,1−yt) at each odd time period t (t = 1,3,5...). The following notation for beliefs will be used:
at time t, let
xi
s denote what i thinks she (i) will oﬀer at any future even time period s > t,
x
j
s denote what j thinks i will oﬀer at any future even time period s > t,
y
j
s denote what j thinks she (j) will oﬀer at any future odd time period s > t,
yi
s denote what i thinks j will oﬀer at any future odd time period s > t.
Note that with time-inconsistent agents, y
j
s ￿= yi
s (s even) and x
j
s ￿= xi
s (s odd) are possible
beliefs. Also note that y
j
s ￿= yi
s ￿= ys (s even) and x
j
s ￿= xi
s ￿= xs (s odd) are possible situations.
Since agents have same discount factors δ and β, we only need to examine the very ﬁrst period
t = 0. This means the oﬀers will be symmetric (same) and will not change over time (since there is
no learning). This implies xs = xs+2 for every s = 2,4,6... and ys = ys+2 for every s = 1,3,5...
At t = 0, i oﬀers (i,j) = (x0,1 − x0) satisfying:
1 − x0 = βδ(1 − yi
1)
i thinks that y1 = δ
1+δ (or yi
1 = δ
1+δ) because she believes she will be time-consistent from
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However, j knows that i will discount tomorrow and the next day by βδ as opposed to her (i￿s)






j thinks that she will be time-consistent after tomorrow and she also thinks that i thinks in
the same way. Moreover, i will think that she (i) will be time-consistent at t = 2, so j believes
xi
2 = x2 = 1
1+δ. This means if j rejects i￿s oﬀer at t = 0, she believes, at t = 1, she can get
1 − y
j
1 = 1 −
βδ
1+δ which is worth βδ(1 − y
j
1) = βδ(1 −
βδ





rejects i￿s oﬀer at t = 0.
When t = 1 comes, j oﬀers y1 =
βδ








1+δ). Since there is no learning, this cycle continues forever and they
will not agree and they both end up with zero payoﬀ.
Introducing learning in the above situation is plausible because after some time, players natu-
rally realize that they are naive to some extend and their optimism is lowered making them consent
to a lower share. The conjecture with learning is that (see section 5) there is a critical date that
parties will not agree up to that date of which they probably are not aware of and agree on that
date.
Proposition 2. Let an EA (he) and a NHA (she) play the alternating-oﬀers bargaining game,
then NBI gives the following result:





x∗ is the share of the EA,
2. If the NHA is the ﬁrst proposer, then she oﬀers (x,1 − x) = ( 1
1+δ, δ
1+δ) where x is the share
of the NHA, the EA rejects this oﬀer at t = 0 and he oﬀers as in the previous case and the gameTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 28
ends with those shares at t = 1.
Proof. 1. If the EA is the ﬁrst proposer and oﬀers 1 − x∗ =
βδ
1+δ to the NHA, since this is
the highest payoﬀ that she can get, she accepts it. She will reject any oﬀer less than this because
she anticipates to get 1 − yNHA
1 = 1
1+δ tomorrow if she rejects today. From the perspective of the
EA, this is also optimal because there is no learning and he cannot expect a higher share in the
future because of this.
2. When the NHA is the ﬁrst proposer, since she thinks the EA has the same beliefs with her
about herself, she thinks the EA will oﬀer yNHA
1 = 1
1+δ. To convince him, she oﬀers him 1−x = δ
1+δ
at t = 0. However, he can get 1 −
βδ
1+δ at t = 1 if he rejects her oﬀer which is worth δ(1 −
βδ
1+δ) at
t = 0. Since δ(1−
βδ
1+δ) > δ
1+δ, he rejects her oﬀer at t = 0, oﬀers y1 =
βδ
1+δ at t = 1 and she accepts
this.
Proposition 3. Let a SHA (he) and a NHA (she) play the alternating-oﬀers bargaining game,
then NBI gives the following result:





where x∗ is the share of the SHA.
2. If the NHA is the ﬁrst proposer, then she oﬀers (x∗,1 − x∗) = (1 − βδ 1−δ
1−βδ2,βδ 1−δ
1−βδ2) where
x∗ is the share of the NHA. The SHA rejects this oﬀer at t = 0 and he oﬀers as in the previous
case and the game ends with those shares at t = 1.
Proof. 1. When the SHA oﬀers ﬁrst, he oﬀers the NHA what she thinks she can get at most
tomorrow if she rejects today. If he oﬀers less, then she will reject this oﬀer. To convince her, he




1−βδ2 is the highest share that she can get if she
rejects today, check ﬁrst remark).TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 29
2. The NHA believes that she will be time-consistent after tomorrow and that the SHA believes
the same thing about her. In order to convince him, she will oﬀer x satisfying:
1 − x = βδ(1 − y)
Due to her wrong belief about him that he can get at most 1−y = 1−δ
1−βδ2 in the next period, she
oﬀers βδ 1−δ
1−βδ2 to him. However, the SHA can get 1 − βδ
1−βδ
1−βδ2 by waiting (rejecting) one period.
He makes the following comparison:












1 − βδ2 − βδ + β2δ2 > 1 − δ ⇒ 1 > β
Thus, at t = 0, the SHA rejects the NHA’s oﬀer, at t = 1 oﬀers βδ
1−βδ
1−βδ2 to her and the game
ends with these shares.
The table above shows the payoﬀs of diﬀerent types of agents in an alternating-oﬀers bargaining
game where we apply NBI as the solution concept.
We now can compare the payoﬀs of each player. The table implies the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Assume each agent has the same time-consistent impatience, δ. Further, assume that
the self-control problems of the agents, if any, are also same, β and δ > β. Then, the second
proposer will always does better in case where she is NHA than the case where she is SHA (except
the opponent is also naive). The more naive she is, the higher share she gets (This is valid for the

























* These payoffs are obtained with one period delay (at t=1, not at t=0).
**
** This represents the perpetual disagreem ent.
Player 2
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Proof. If a player makes the second oﬀer, then in terms of payoﬀs, if she is EA, then
she does better than the case where she is NHA who does better than the case where she is
SHA (except the opponent is also naive where they both end up with nothing). In other words,








1 − βδ2 ;1 −
1 − δ
1 − βδ2 >
βδ − β2δ2
1 − βδ2 >
βδ
1 + βδ
If a player makes the ﬁrst oﬀer, then, the above result is satisﬁed for some speciﬁc parameter
values. When the naive agent is the ﬁrst proposer there is always delay. When the opponent is EA
or SHA, it is only one period but when the opponent is also naive, there is actually no agreement.
The following conditions have to be satisﬁed:
1. βδ
βδ
1 + δ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
Earned with one period delay
>
1 − δ








but since condition 2 implies condition 1, only condition 2 has to be satisﬁed. For those
parameters satisfying condition 2, the theorem holds for the ﬁrst proposer.
5. E-#￿*￿￿￿￿#￿ W￿￿￿ L￿￿￿￿￿￿/: U￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿*2 W￿￿￿￿￿/ T￿ B￿ P￿￿￿#￿"￿"
We will now study the other two approaches, namely immediate and gradual learning by using
NBI as the solution concept. Since learning is an issue for only naive and partially naive agents,
from this point on, at least one of the parties engaging in bargaining is naive or partially naive.
The reason that we obtain an immediate agreement result without learning is the persistence of
the NHA in being naive (persistent optimism about herself to be time-consistent in the future).
No matter how the game proceeds, she believes that she will be time-consistent after today. More
importantly, since principal believes that naive agent will stay as naive whatever happens, he givesTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 32
up, in some sense, and oﬀers a share that conﬁrms the NHA’s wrong belief about herself. He cannot
do anything but accept her as she is, because he does not have any better option.
Yildiz (2003) examines the eﬀect of optimism about making oﬀers in the future in a sequential
bargaining model and he shows that if players will remain suﬃciently optimistic for a suﬃciently
long future, then in equilibrium, they will agree immediately. He also states that "the players may
have diﬀering beliefs about the discount rates. As in the case of bargaining breakdown, this will
not yield any delay in equilibrium, provided that the players do not update their beliefs about the
future discount rates as they play the game". This is what we showed in the previous section that
as long as there is no updating in beliefs about the future discount rates, there will be an immediate
agreement. Our case is the case where excessive and persistent optimism does not cause delay in
bargaining.
We will now allow players to learn as they play the game. If we let the EA hold optimistic beliefs
about the naive player that she (NHA) may change her beliefs about herself (basically waiting for
the NHA to be more sophisticated in time), then since the EA gets more from sophisticated agent,
it may be optimal for him to wait. If he holds this optimistic belief, then he makes oﬀers, which will
be rejected by the NHA, to make her realize her self-control problem. The EA, given his beliefs,
decides what to do based on the trade-oﬀ between cost of waiting and getting higher expected
share. The NHA will be in a situation where "she will unconsciously wait to be persuaded".
As stated in O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), delaying forever or sticking to same belief about
herself is prevented by diﬀerent forces such as deadlines and learning. After repeatedly planning to
do a task in the near future or holding the same belief about herself, not carrying out these plans
or not acting in accordance with those beliefs, the person may realize the uselessness of such plans
or beliefs and may just do the task now or update her belief about herself. While generalizationTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 33
of this learning process is questionable in real-life, we observe such learning in speciﬁc strategic
environments.
Our learning approach is parallel with Yildiz (2004). In that paper, he allows players being
optimistic about their bargaining power (measured as the probability of making oﬀers), but they
can also learn as they play the game. In our context, we allow the rational agent to hold optimistic
belief about the NHA and the NHA to update her beliefs in time. Of course, she is, naturally, not
aware of this characteristic of herself (that is she is not aware that she will update her beliefs).
In fact, this unawareness may lead to delay in bargaining. Since the EA is optimistic about her
belief updating, in order to make her update her beliefs, he makes oﬀers that are not expected
and that will be rejected by the NHA. A sequence of rejected oﬀers will make the NHA realize her
self-control problems and become more sophisticated.
5.1. Immediate Learning. Assume that when there is one rejection, the NHA immediately
realize her time-inconsistency (she becomes sophisticated).
Proposition 4. 1. Let the EA oﬀer ﬁrst. If βδ(1 − βδ2) > (1 − δ2)(1 + δ − βδ2) then, there will
be one period delay. If βδ(1 − βδ2) ≤ (1 − δ2)(1 + δ − βδ2) then, there will be no delay.
2. Let the NHA oﬀer ﬁrst. Then, there will always be one-period delay.
Proof. 1. If the EA oﬀers less than x = 1−
βδ
1+δ, then the NHA will reject it by thinking that
next period she can get at least this much share of the pie, so he can get at at most 1−
βδ
1+δ today.
If he makes a rejected oﬀer, then she immediately becomes a SHA. Then she oﬀers 1− 1−δ
1−βδ2 to the
EA (from the previous part). Then, the trade-oﬀ of the EA is deciding between getting 1 −
βδ
1+δ
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or
(1 − δ2)(1 + δ − βδ2) < βδ(1 − βδ2)
then, there will be agreement at t = 1 (not at t = 0) with y = 1 − 1−δ
1−βδ2.
2. The NHA, at t = 0, oﬀers 1 − y = δ −
βδ2
1+δ to the EA. If he rejects this, she becomes a SHA
and the EA oﬀers x =
βδ(1−δ)
1−βδ2 and get 1 − x =
1−βδ
1−βδ2. Then, the trade-oﬀ of the EA is deciding
between getting 1 − y = δ −
βδ2
1+δ today and getting 1 − x =
1−βδ
1−βδ2 tomorrow. However, since the







(1 + δ − βδ)(1 − βδ2) < (1 − βδ)(1 + δ)
β2δ3 < βδ3
there will always be one period delay. So, the EA oﬀers x =
βδ(1−δ)
1−βδ2 to the NHA at t = 1 and
she accepts it.
5.2. Gradual Learning. To make the learning process clear, following examples can be given:
Example 1. Think about a student who decides to buy a pass for the gym in school to attend
it regularly (to lose weight or for bodybuilding). He has optimistic belief that he will keep going
to the gym regularly. However, it turns out that he is not able to do this due to diﬀerent reasons
(other activities, boredom, laziness). At the beginning of the next semester, he will again consider
to buy the pass, but since he has this experience from the past (in other words, he realizes his
self-control problem to some extent), he makes diﬀerent commitments (buy it with his friend so
they go together) or (he realized enough such that)he does not buy it at all. However, he continues
to have the same experience again and again, eventually he gives up buying gym pass.TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 35
Example 2. Think about a student who decides to audit (no registration, just sit in a class and
listen) diﬀerent courses not from his major (e.g., to increase his job opportunities) (or registers
morning sections of core courses). He has optimistic belief that he will continue to audit these
courses till the end of the semester (he will wake up early and attend classes regularly) but he is
not able to do this due to diﬀerent reasons (other courses, boredom, laziness). At the beginning of
the next semester, he will again consider to audit some courses (register morning sections), but since
he has this experience from the past, he audits fewer courses than before (registers less morning
sections). However, he continues to have the same experience again and again, eventually he gives
up auditing any courses (registering any morning section).
These are some examples that include interactions among the agent’s selves. It would not be
true to generalize this in the sense that naive (or partially naive) agent will be sophisticated in all
situations that she faces. However, in particular environments, naive agents may actually learn and
update their beliefs about themselves. In strategic environments including interaction with diﬀerent
players, which is more challenging and requires more careful thinking, this learning process may
tend to be faster or to occur earlier during the play.
We assume that partially naive agent holds an initial belief (probability of using discount factor
βδ in the future) about her future self-control problem. She does not think that she will update
her belief but when she faces with rejections, she will actually update her beliefs. We assume the
partially naive agent’s beliefs have beta distributions that are widely used in statistical learning
models. The learning model closely follows Yildiz (2004).
We will ﬁx any positive integers mβδ and n with 1 ≤ mβδ ≤ n−2 where n measures ﬁrmness of
the partially naive agent’s prior belief. We assume that her initial belief, t = 0, that she will alsoTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 36
be impatient in the future is
mβδ





is the probability that she will use δ as her discount factor in the future) at any date s ≥ t = m.
This updating structure arises when the agent believes that using βδ discount factor in the future
is a random variable distributed with some unknown parameter α that measures the probability
of the agent using βδ at any date t, and α is distributed with a beta distribution with paramaters
mβδ and n.
What we described in the last paragraph is not common knowledge. Interestingly, naivete leads
to the following situation that the partially naive agent is not aware of this updating structure but
we assume the rational agent knows this and actually, acquisition of this knowledge is the reason
for a possible delay.
The argument above implies that the perceived discount factor of the NHA at any date s ≥ t =
m will be
δm = ￿ βδ = [
mβδ + m
n + m
β + (1 −
mβδ + m
n + m




This implies that the partially naive agent’s perception of her β is ﬁxed and equal to ￿ β for the
entire future. In other words, her belief about date 50 at t = 49, which depends highly on the
history, will be quite diﬀerent than his belief about date 50 at t = 0. What the intrinsic assumption
here is that she is not perfectly "forward looking". She does not take into account that she may
change her beliefs in the future too as she is doing now (when she observes a rejection). Being
partially naive here means that each rejection is unexpected. Yildiz (2004) also has a similar
assumption (e.g., agents’ beliefs at date 0 about dates 100 and 200 are identical).
Note that perceived discount factor of the naive agent, δt, is inversely related to the number of
rejections, m :TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 37
δ > δ0 > δ1 > δ2 > ... > δm
When the number of rejections goes to inﬁnity, the partially naive agent becomes sophisticated
(as m → ∞, δm → βδ). Under this learning scheme, since n represents the ﬁrmness of initial
belief of the partially naive agent, a person is perfectly naive if 1 ≤ mβδ << n → ∞. In other
words, a larger n implies a more severe naivete. In addition, learning slows down in time with this
speciﬁcation. For the sake of learning argument being signiﬁcant, ﬁrst, we assume the agent is not
so ﬁrm in her initial belief. In the case where the agent is too ﬁrm, likelihood of obtaining delay is
low as we will mention a result that relates the ﬁrmness level with the extent of bargaining delay.
In this game, under this kind of learning and information acquisition assumptions, the EA is
the only one who determines the outcome of the game. The partially naive agent plays the game as
she is supposed to play and the EA knows this. Depending on the partially naive agent’s learning
process, the EA speciﬁes the resulting shares and the time at which the game ﬁnishes. Following
lemma states one aspect of this feature of the game:
Lemma 1. The NHA’s oﬀers are never accepted by the EA.
Proof. At any time t = 2k + 1, k = 0,1,2..., the partially naive agent makes an oﬀer,
which we call as y2k+1(δ2k+1) and the EA’s oﬀers at even periods as x2k(δ2k). If we reach at time
t = 2k+1, this means m = 2k+1 rejections occurred as of time t. She has been updating her beliefs
during this time and now, her perception on discount factors of herself for any time t > m = 2k+1
is δ2k+1. Note that at t = 2k + 1, she discounts payoﬀs at t = 2k + 2 again by βδ but thinks she
will discount payoﬀs at each t > 2k + 2 by δ2k+1.TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 38





We also know that, the EA oﬀers





































⇒ 1 − δδ2k+2 > 1 − δ2k+2 + βδ − βδ2
⇒ δ2k+2 > βδ
The last inequality is true by deﬁnition, so this implies y2k+1(δ2k+1) < δx2k+2(δ2k+2) ∀k. Thus,
EA rejects y2k+1(δ2k+1) ∀k.
The rationale behind this result is that the partially naive agent always oﬀers the present value
of what she thinks her rational opponent expects to earn from rejecting. However, since she willTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 39
update her beliefs in case of a rejection, his expectation is always higher than what she predicts.
This is because by rejecting the oﬀer, he makes her a little more sophisticated that allows him to
extract more from her at the next period and she is not aware of this.
The partially naive player is not perfectly ﬁrm (
mβδ
n > 0) that she updates her belief as she is
rejected but this updating process slows down over time. The following theorem shows that one
sided learning in the existence of partially naive agents may explain delays in bargaining games.
Basic intution behind this is that the rational agent can extract more share from the partially naive
agent by making her more sophisticated by rejecting her oﬀers and delaying the game but since
delay is costly, when the cost of delaying exceeds this beneﬁt, he ﬁnishes the game. Thus, this
trade oﬀ between beneﬁt and cost of delaying motivates the following theorem.
Theorem 3. In the sequential bargaining game between a partially naive player and a rational
player, there exists a t∗ such that before t∗ players do not reach an agreement and at each time
t ≥ t∗ when the rational agent oﬀers, players reach an agreement immediately.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that the partially naive agent’s oﬀers will be rejected at each
odd period. Then, the rational agent will compare following payoﬀs that he can get at each even
period:
x0(δ0),δ2x2(δ2),...,δ2k−2x2k−2(δ2k−2),δ2kx2k(δ2k),δ2k+2x2k+2(δ2k+2),...
Since he is time consistent and will make the same comparison at any given period of time, he
will choose the largest element of the above sequence today and will implement what he decided
today.
Note that payoﬀ that he can get is increasing in time but waiting is costly. Hence, there should
be an optimal waiting time that allows him to extract as highest share as possible from the partiallyTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 40





Since at t∗ = 2k∗, it is not optimal to delay the game anymore, he oﬀers (xt∗(δt∗),1−xt∗(δt∗)),
she accepts and the game ends at t = t∗. We have this treshold t∗ because as time passes, learning
slows down and the additional payoﬀ that he expects by waiting due to increase in sophistication
of the partially naive agent is oﬀset by the loss of waiting. In any case of multiplicity of optimal
value of k, we take the minimum of those k values as k∗.
In brief, theorem 3 states that if we let the rational agent hold optimistic beliefs about the
partially naive agent and let her learn in time (she is unaware of this), then depending on the
parameter values, delay in bargaining may occur. It may well be the case that t∗ = k∗ = 0. The
following corollary shows that if the prior belief of the partially naive agent is suﬃciently low (n is
suﬃciently high) then, there will be an immediate agreement (e.g., t∗ = k∗ = 0).
Corollary 1. For any given β and δ, there exists some n∗ such that ∀n ≥ n∗, the players reach an
agreement immediately in case that the rational player is ﬁrst proposer and if the partially naive
agent is oﬀering ﬁrst, then there will be one period delay by Lemma 1.
Proof. Given any β and δ, in order for players to reach an immediate agreement, the following




≥ δ2TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 41
Deﬁne the following function:
F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) = δ2x2k+2(δ2k+2) − x2k(δ2k)








Note that ∀k, δ2k → δ and
x2k(δ2k)
x2k+2(δ2k+2) → 1 as n → ∞. Also, F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) < 0 implies
immediate agreement. As n → ∞, F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) → δ2 − 1 < 0. Thus, there exists an n∗ such
that for any n ≥ n∗, the above condition is satisﬁed. This is the case where the rational agent
is the ﬁrst proposer. If the partially naive agent is the ﬁrst proposer, then by Lemma 1, for any
n ≥ n∗ the rational agent rejects her oﬀer at t = 0 and by the above argument, at t = 1, players
immediately agree.
Figure 1 shows delay depending on ”δ” and some speciﬁc parameter values β = 0.5, mβδ = 1
and k = 0. As the corollary suggests, for any given patience level, δ, we can ﬁnd a ﬁrmness level of
the agent, n, that will lead to immediate agreement in the bargaining game (F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) ≤ 0,
e.g., given β = 0.5, mβδ = 1 and δ = 0.995, for all values of n satisfying n ≥ n∗ = 3050, we get
immediate agreement result).
The following corollary shows that as long as rational agent is patient enough, there will not be
an immediate agreement.
Corollary 2. For any given mβδ, β and n satisfying condition 1 below, there exists a δ∗ such that
for every δ ≥ δ∗ there will be 2k + 2, k = 0,1,2..., periods delay (or m = 2k + 2 rejections) in case
that the rational agent is the ﬁrst proposer and if the partially naive agent is oﬀering ﬁrst, thenTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 42
there will be 2k + 3 period delay (or m = 2k + 3 rejections) by Lemma 1.




where ￿x￿ is the ceiling function that gives the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
Proof. Given any mβδ, β and n, if the following condition is satistied then, there will be
2k + 2 periods delay:




where x2k(δ2k) = 1 −
βδ(1 − δ)
1 − δδ2k




Deﬁne function F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) as in the proof of Corollary 1:
F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) = δ2x2k+2(δ2k+2) − x2k(δ2k)
F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) = δ2 −
βδ3(1 − δ)





1 − δ2[1 − (1 − β)(
mβδ+2k
n+2k )]
Then, (2) implies that for any given β,mβδ,n, if there exists a δ∗ such that for any δ ≥ δ∗
F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) > 0 (3)
is satisﬁed then, there will be 2k + 2 periods delay.
It is easy to show that F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) is continuous in δ and limδ→1 F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) = 0
for every parameter value of β,n,mβδ and k. Note that if
dF(δ;β,n,mβδ,k)
dδ |δ=1 < 0, then (3) is true.
In other words, when δ gets close to one, F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) approaches zero from ﬁrst quadrant or
F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) > 0 for values of δ close to 1. Now it is enough to show that
dF(δ;β,n,mβδ,k)
dδ
|δ=1 < 0TIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 43
to prove the corollary.
F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) = δ2 −
βδ3(1 − δ)












βδ2(3 − 4δ)(1 − δ2[1 − (1 − β)(
mβδ+2k+2
n+2k+2 )]) − βδ4(1 − δ)(−2 + 2(1 − β)(
mβδ+2k+2
n+2k+2 ))




β(1 − 2δ)(1 − δ2[1 − (1 − β)(
mβδ+2k
n+2k )]) − βδ2(1 − δ)(−2 + 2(1 − β)(
mβδ+2k
n+2k ))




















Since n is integer and the right side of Condition 1 above may not be integer, we round this
value to the smallest integer greater than or equal to it represented by the ceiling function:




Thus, for any given values of β,mβδ and n satisfying Condition 1, there exists a δ∗ such that
for any δ ≥ δ∗, we will have 2k + 2 periods delay in the bargaining game between the partially
naive agent and the rational agent.
Figure 2 shows delay depending on n and some speciﬁc parameter values β = 0.5, mβδ = 1 and
k = 0. As this corollary suggests, whatever the value of n, we can ﬁnd a patience level δ that willTIME INCONSISTENCY AND LEARNING IN BARGAINING GAMES 44
cause delay (F(δ;β,n,mβδ,k) > 0, e.g., given β = 0.5, mβδ = 1 and n = 100, for all values of δ
satisfying δ ≥ δ∗ = 0.9778, we get at least 2 period delay- k = 0).
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